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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-one years ago, in the course of an article mostly devoted to the
Equal Access Act,' I distinguished two meanings of government "neutrality"
toward religion. I explained that I did not mean neutrality "in the sense of a ban
on religious classifications," but rather neutrality "in the sense of government
conduct that insofar as possible neither encourages nor discourages religious
belief or practice."'2 That definition seemed straightforward enough to me, but
both the definition and its application were controversial to those who com-
mented on my paper.3
I Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. This article was a
Keynote Address at the Conference on The Religion Clauses in the 21st Century at the West Vir-
ginia University College of Law. The other keynote speaker was Steven Gey, whose work is
addressed in part IV of this Article. I am grateful to the conference participants for helpful com-
ments and questions. I also presented this paper at Harvard Law School in October 2007, with
Noah Feldman as a commentator. I am grateful to Professor Feldman for a very helpful exchange,
which is now reflected in the text.
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000).
2 Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). I published a nearly identical formu-
lation about the same time in Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 922 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock, "Nonpref-
erential" Aid].
3 See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146,
149 n. 17 (1986) ("commend[ing]" my "somewhat heterodox formulation of neutrality"); Geoffrey
R. Stone, The Equal Access Controversy: The Religion Clauses and the Meaning of "Neutrality,"
81 Nw. U. L. REv. 168, 169-71 (1986) (arguing that the Constitution requires only neutrality
1
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Four years later, returning to the point in a more general way, I distin-
guished formal neutrality, substantive neutrality, and disaggregated neutrality
toward religion, and I urged substantive neutrality as the best understanding of
religious liberty.4 Since then, substantive neutrality has been a unifying theme
of my work on the Religion Clauses.5
Over the years, substantive neutrality has been praised,6 defended,7 and
even more or less adopted.8 It has been independently invented under other
names.9 It has been adopted analytically by authors who rejected it norma-
tively, 0 and adopted normatively, more or less, by authors who rejected it ana-
among religions, and not neutrality between religious and nonreligious speech, where there is
substantial government interest in excluding religious speech); Ruti Teitel, When Separate Is
Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 174-76 (1986) (arguing that in context of public schools, religious and
nonreligious speech are different, and that it is therefore discriminatory to treat them the same).
4 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
5 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the
Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REV. 227,
232-36 (2004) (using substantive neutrality to analyze a state program of scholarships for all
majors except theology); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156
(2004) [hereinafter Laycock, Theology Scholarships] (undertaking to review cases of theology
scholarships and the Pledge of Allegiance "from a perspective of substantive neutrality"); Douglas
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 68-73 (1997)
[hereinafter Laycock, Underlying Unity] (offering substantive neutrality as a way of uniting sepa-
ration and neutrality); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL
ISSUES 313, 319-20, 347-51 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Liberty] (urging substantive neutrality
and responding to a misunderstanding of the concept).
6 See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
67 n.275 (1996) (saying that I have "cogently" criticized formal neutrality and proposed substan-
tive neutrality); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
263 n.248 (1994) ("best work on the general idea of religious neutrality").
7 See Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected As Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1185, 1211-15 (2007) (defending substantive neutrality against attacks in CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (Harvard Univ.
Press 2007)).
8 See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 703-07
(1997) (arguing that government should "minimize the effect it has on the voluntary, independent
religious decisions of the people as individuals and in voluntary groups").
9 See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
10 See Robin Charlow, The Elusive Meaning of Religious Equality, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1529,
1536-37, 1563-66 (2005) (accepting the difference between formal and substantive neutrality, but
ultimately seeming to reject any commitment to neutrality or equality as unworkable); Keith Wer-
han, Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the Pledge, and the Limits of a Purposive
Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603, 608-09, 612, 628 (2003) (using formal and substan-
tive neutrality to analyze the Court's reasoning, but concluding that results generated by substan-
tive neutrality are counterintuitive).
[Vol. 110
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lytically.1 It has been noted, 12 analyzed,' 3 criticized, 14 ridiculed, 5 and ig-
nored.' 6 Nearly all the attention, for good and ill, has come from other academ-
ics. Of all the thousands of judges in America, only Justice Souter has ever
I I See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 112 n.477 (1998) ("It is a view I share, but it is not neutral."); Frank S.
Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and
the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REv. 489, 505 (2004) ("Professor Laycock's substantive
neutrality has a lot to recommend it... [H]is approach has a lot of substantive value, but no neu-
trality.").
12 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology
to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2000) (finding substantive
neutrality "attractive," but difficult to apply, and a clear trend to formal equality in the Supreme
Court's cases).
13 See John H. Garvey, All Things Being Equal, 1996 BYU L. REv. 587, 595-97, 601-04, 609
(1996) (arguing that the case for substantive neutrality depends on a prior normative judgment that
religious faith is a good thing); see generally Hugh J. Breyer, Laycock's Substantive Neutrality
and Neuchterlein's Free Exercise Test: Implications of Their Convergence for the Religion
Clauses, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 467 (1994) (generally adopting substantive neutrality but arguing that
it is incomplete). For my attempt to justify substantive neutrality without making any judgments
about the value of religion, see Laycock, Liberty, supra note 5, at 314-23.
14 STEVEN D. SMrrH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 81 (1995) (arguing that substantive neutrality
depends on certain contested assumptions about the value and sources of religious belief, and thus
is not neutral); Steven K. Green, Locke v. Davey and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 TEMP. L.
REV. 913, 947-48 (2004) (arguing that neutral awards of grants to religious and secular providers
alike does not ameliorate the problems of government funding of religious institutions); Toni M.
Massaro, Religious Freedom and "Accommodationist Neutrality": A Non-Neutral Critique, 84
OR. L. REV. 935, 995-96 & n.267 (2005) (arguing that neutrality toward religion is appropriate in
some domains but not others, and certainly not with respect to funding); see generally Paul E.
Salamanca, Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Establishment Clause Toward
Realistic Substantive Neutrality, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 575 (2003) (arguing that substantive neutrality
is a marginal criterion because people's religious beliefs are largely immune to government pres-
sure or discrimination); Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215, 227-28
(2002) [hereinafter Smith, Separation] (treating substantive neutrality as an example of the im-
plausible claim that new legal conclusions have been developed from fixed underlying principles);
Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 710-23 (2005)
(arguing that substantive neutrality is not neutral, and that its goals would be better supported by
arguing for "substantive liberty").
15 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious
Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 79, 119 (1997) (arguing that if religion
were unaffected by government, "the life of a religious institution [would be] nasty, brutish, and
short"); Lino A. Graglia, City of Boerne v. Flores: An Essay on the Invalidation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 68 Miss. L.J. 675, 675-77 (1998) ("Neutrality is still the requirement,
there is no quarreling with that, it's just that it now means discrimination. Nothing better illus-
trates the essence of the lawyerly arts."). I anticipated Eisgruber and Sager's state-of-nature argu-
ment, without providing an equally bright-line alternative baseline, in Laycock, supra note 4, at
1005-06.
16 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005) (never mentioning "substantive neutrality").
2007]
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cited my account of substantive neutrality in reported opinions, and of course he
did it only when it suited his purposes.
17
My purpose here is to briefly review substantive neutrality, perhaps re-
freshing the recollections of some readers and introducing an unfamiliar concept
to others, to clarify what I mean, and to compare and contrast substantive neu-
trality with prominent proposals from Noah Feldman and Steven Gey. Profes-
sor Feldman and I have similar centrist instincts, yet come to proposed solutions
that are almost diametrically opposed on important issues. 18 That seems to be a
phenomenon worth investigating. Professor Gey, who is academia's most able
and most prominent defender of absolutely no aid to religion, views substantive
neutrality with a despairing and mystified air-as if to say: what's a nice guy
like you, who sometimes sounds like a separationist, doing with a proposal like
that?19 I will try to answer.
II. SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY
A. Vocabulary
I distinguished three measures of neutrality-two intellectually coherent
measures, plus one incoherent measure that courts had stumbled into by inad-
vertence. For better or worse, I called these measures formal neutrality, sub-
stantive neutrality, and disaggregated neutrality.2°
Formal neutrality requires neutral categories. A law is formally neutral
if it does not use religion as a category-if religious and secular examples of the
same phenomenon are treated exactly the same.
Substantive neutrality requires neutral incentives. A law is substan-
tively neutral if it neither "encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or dis-
17 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561-62 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Scalia has used the phrase in a religious liberty case, without attribution and without indicat-
ing what he thought it meant or whether he approved. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730
(2004). Other judges have used the phrase in unrelated contexts. See, e.g., Free Speech Coal. v.
Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68-69
(1st Cir. 1999) (using the phrase in a child pornography case arising under the Free Speech
Clause); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 537 (4th Cir. 1970) (using the phrase to
describe the proper attitude of federal courts toward state law under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938)).
18 Compare FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 237 (proposing "greater latitude for public religious
discourse and religious symbolism, and at the same time ... a stricter ban on state funding of
religious institutions and activities"), with Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 160
(arguing that broadly inclusive scholarship program should have been required to include theology
majors, and that "under God" should be removed from the Pledge of Allegiance).
19 See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 725, 786-88 (2006) (puzzling over recent work by me and others that he views as
abandoning separationism and as mischaracterizing the debate).
20 Laycock, supra note 4, at 999, 1001, 1007.
[Vol. 110
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belief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.' I will return to
disaggregated neutrality in due course.
To illustrate formal and substantive neutrality with a very simple and
clear cut example, forbidding children to take communion wine is formally neu-
tral. Children cannot consume alcoholic beverages in any amount for any pur-
pose. Religion is not a category in the formulation or application of this rule;
alcohol is forbidden to children whether for religious purposes or secular pur-
poses.
But an exception that permits children to take communion wine is sub-
stantively neutral. Exempting communion wine from the ban on under-age con-
sumption of alcohol is extraordinarily unlikely to induce anyone to become a
Christian, to join a denomination that uses real wine in its communion service,
or to attend communion services more often-unless that person already desired
to do these things but had been deterred by the threat of government-imposed
penalties. Consuming communion wine is a desirable activity only to those who
already believe in the religious teaching that gives meaning to the act. Forbid-
ding children to take communion wine, or criminally punishing their parents and
the priest who gives them the sacrament, powerfully discourages an act of wor-
ship. But exemption does not encourage any child to take communion, or any
parent to take his child to a communion service, who is not already religiously
motivated do so. An exemption does not change anyone's religious incentives;
criminalization changes those incentives profoundly.
Some critics reject this explanation out of hand. To them, neutrality
simply is what I have called formal neutrality. No other kind of neutrality is
imaginable, and substantive neutrality is not neutrality at all. An exemption
from a generally applicable law is special treatment, and to claim that exemption
is a form of neutrality is mere verbal wordplay.22
I have learned to explain that formal neutrality requires neutral catego-
ries, and substantive neutrality requires neutral incentives;23 So perhaps I
should have called these two standards "category neutrality" and "incentive
neutrality." Category neutrality and incentive neutrality may better emphasize
that each is a real measure of neutrality and that each focuses on a specific crite-
rion that must be kept neutral. Judge Posner and then-Professor McConnell did
use the phrases "category neutrality" and "incentive neutrality" to describe a
very similar idea24 in an article published while my elaboration of neutrality was
21 Id. at 1001.
22 See Graglia, supra note 15, at 676; Tebbe, supra note 14, at 714-23.
23 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Un-
derstanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793, 1797-98 (2006) (making
the point clearly and succinctly); Laycock, Liberty, supra note 5, at 319-20 (making the point a
little less clearly).
24 Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 37 (1989).
20071
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in the editorial process.25 But it is too late now. Category neutrality and incen-
tive neutrality have gotten almost no attention, probably because McConnell and
Posner mentioned their proposed labels only briefly, deep in an article with a
title promising an economic analysis of religious liberty. Formal and substan-
tive neutrality were part of my title and the centerpiece of my article, with the
result that these labels have been cited far more often.2 6 For better or worse,
formal neutrality and substantive neutrality have become the labels for the dis-
tinction that McConnell, Posner, and I tried to draw.
Stephen Monsma, a political scientist at Pepperdine, proposed a similar
idea in 1993 and called it "positive neutrality. 27 That label has not caught on
either. To that large part of our culture that fears or mistrusts organized relig-
ion, I fear that "positive neutrality" may sound like neutrality with some meas-
ure of favoritism.
B. Neutrality in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has been notoriously inconsistent in its uses of the
idea of neutrality. It sometimes talks about "benevolent neutrality, '28 or
"wholesome neutrality, '29 but neither of these modifiers was ever used consis-
tently to mean a specific theory of neutrality. And "benevolent neutrality" may
have the same problem as "positive neutrality;" to some people, it sounds like
neutrality with favoritism included.
25 My article was based on a lecture delivered in April 1989, and for the most part, it spoke "as
of that date." Laycock, supra note 4, at 993 n.*. Professor McConnell attended the lecture. I read
and commented on the McConnell and Posner article in manuscript, McConnell & Posner, supra
note 24, at n.l, and cited it in my article, Laycock, supra note 4, at 995 n.13. Neither McConnell
nor I had the foresight to suggest that we settle on a common vocabulary. It is possible that dis-
tinguishing the two forms of neutrality was a late addition to the McConnell and Posner manu-
script, so that I did not see their proposed vocabulary when I read the draft.
26 A search in Westlaw's "Text and Periodicals - All" database, as of September 3, 2007,
yielded four hits for "McConnell" in the same paragraph as "incentive neutrality," but 118 hits for
"Laycock" in the same paragraph as "substantive neutrality."
27 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, POSITIvE NEUTRALITY: LETTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RING 188
(Greenwood Press 1993) (proposing "to assure that religious associations and communities, and
their individual members, are not constricted or disadvantaged in the living-out of their religious
beliefs," and that they "not transgress on the rights and prerogatives of the other spheres and that
one religious structure does not transgress on those of another or of nonbelievers").
28 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994); Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792
(1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 676 (1970).
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The Court often equates neutrality with formal neutrality, with no
analysis or explanation,30 but many of its classic formulations of religious neu-
trality read as statements of substantive neutrality. Thus, in Everson v. Board of
Education,31 the Court said that "[n]either [a state nor the federal government]
can force [or] influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will[.] ' '32 This speaks not to categories of classification, but to government
conduct that may change, or "influence," private religious behavior. Other parts
of that famous paragraph, and the equally important but neglected paragraph
that follows (the one that says no person can be deprived of a social welfare
benefit because of his faith or lack of faith33) are equally consistent with either
formal or substantive neutrality. To say that no person can be punished 34 or de-
prived of a social welfare benefit 35 because of his religious views implements
formal neutrality (because punishment or loss of benefits on the basis of reli-
gious belief would create rules and categories based on religion), and it also
implements substantive neutrality (because punishment or loss of benefits would
discourage the religious belief). Some sentences are written in terms of no-aid
to religion,36 a position that is a principal alternative to neutrality of any kind,
although the Court appeared to think in 1947 that the two approaches were con-
sistent. I do not claim that Everson adopted substantive neutrality; I do claim
that substantive neutrality was one of the multiple meanings of neutrality that
the Court jumbled together and failed to distinguish.
In Sherbert v. Verner,37 and again in Wisconsin v. Yoder,38 the Court re-
lied on "neutrality" to strike down rules that were defended as formally neutral
and which the Court seemed to view as formally neutral. 39 The Court said that
30 See, most famously, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990), which held
that burdens on religious practice require no justification if imposed by laws that are neutral and
generally applicable.
31 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32 Id. at 15.
33 Id. at 16.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 15 ("Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, [or] aid all religions[.]").
37 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (holding that the state cannot refuse unemployment compensation
to employee who loses her job because of religious refusal to work on her Sabbath).
38 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (holding that Amish parents cannot be required to send their chil-
dren to public high school).
39 The Court might have said that the South Carolina law in Sherbert was not even formally
neutral, but that was not the holding. In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
Court said that the requirement of "good cause" for refusing work means that unemployment
compensation laws allow secular exceptions, so that it is discriminatory to refuse religious excep-
tions. Id. at 884. But there is no suggestion of that theory in Sherbert, and the only South Caro-
lina cases cited in Sherbert held that the proffered secular reasons for refusing work were not good
cause. 374 U.S. at 401 n.4. The state's entire economy was organized around the mainstream
Christian observance of Sunday, but the Court has never understood the discrimination inherent in
20071
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accommodation or exemption from regulation "reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences[.]" 40
And more specifically, "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if
it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."4" The Court did not explain its
understanding of neutrality in these passages, but it can only have meant what I
have called substantive neutrality.
In School District v. Schempp,42 the Court offered a "test" to define
"[tihe wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak":
43
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
"That is to say" implies that these two formulations were intended to be
equivalent-that a "secular" purpose is simply any purpose other than a purpose
to advance nor inhibit religion. But that equivalence was hidden when the Court
quoted the requirement of "secular legislative purpose" without the two sen-
tences that preceded it. Only the "secular purpose" formulation was incorpo-
rated into the famous Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
that. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (treating a school teacher's re-
quest for days off for religious observance as an "acconmodation" under 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j),
even though school's entire calendar was set up so that school never met on Sunday, Easter, or
Christmas, and except for extracurricular activities, never met on Saturday); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (treating Sunday closing law as "simply regulat[ing] a secular activity"
and refusing exemption to Saturday Sabbath observer); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (upholding Sunday-closing laws against Establishment Clause challenge). The Court in
Sherbert did note that South Carolina law protected Sunday observers from job loss, but it viewed
this discrimination as merely "compound[ing]" a constitutional violation that was already com-
plete when the state refused unemployment compensation to Saturday observers. 398 U.S. at 406.
40 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 n.22 (1972) (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409).
41 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
42 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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advances nor inhibits religion[.]" 45 Secular purpose thereafter took on a life of
its own, but it was only very occasionally the basis for a judgment.
46
The Court's description of the prohibited effect did not suffer the same
ambiguity. The Court's rule that government must neither advance nor inhibit
religion appears to be equivalent to my proposed rule that government neither
encourage nor discourage religion. No advancing or inhibiting is a neutrality
standard, but the word "neutrality" does not appear in the canonical formulation
of the Lemon test. And of course the doctrine did not work out to be either for-
mally neutral or substantively neutral in practice. In part this was because the
justices who administered the Lemon test had goals not fully captured in its
wording. In part it was because these justices did not attend to the question of
the baseline from which to measure advancing or inhibiting. And in part it was
because the second prong of the Lemon test could be read to state two separate
requirements: no effect of advancing religion, and, independently, no effect of
inhibiting religion.
It was this verbal accident that I described as "disaggregated neutral-
ity.' '47 Instead of asking directly whether a statute was as neutral as could be
under the circumstances, or more nearly neutral than any available alternative,
courts asked simply whether a statute had an effect that "advanc[ed]" religion.48
The "inhibits" part of the test became a mere recital, undeveloped and without
content, and the Court ignored the possibility that its own judgments inhibited
religion. So far as I am aware, the Court has never struck down any law on the
ground that it has a primary effect that inhibits religion. But from 1971 to 1985,
45 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The third prong of the Lemon test is avoid-
ing "excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 613.
46 Government actions were invalidated for lack of secular purpose in McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-74, 881 (2005) (Ten Commandments display); Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000) (prayer at high school football games); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-93 (1987) (teaching of creation science); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (moment of silence with legislative encouragement to pray); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (Ten Commandments display); and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107-09 (1968) (ban on teaching evolution). The Court also found an effect of advancing relig-
ion in Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312, and it would have been easy enough to find such effects in
McCreary, Stone, and probably Jaffree. Purpose may have mattered only in Aguillard and
Epperson, the two cases on evolution in the public schools, and I suspect that even there, the same
justices would have reached the same result with or without the secular-purpose requirement.
Even if we count all six of these cases as turning on a purpose to advance religion, there
were far more cases that found or assumed a secular purpose. In all the cases on financial aid to
religious schools, there was a secular purpose to aid education. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
Alleviating regulatory burdens on religion is a secular purpose. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987). More dubiously, the Court held that Sunday closing laws
had a secular purpose, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and that municipal nativity
scenes had a secular purpose, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984).
47 Laycock, supra note 4, at 1007-08.
48 See id. (analyzing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
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ever smaller and more attenuated effects were held to have a primary effect of
advancing religion. The risk that public school teachers, and employees deliver-
ing "auxiliary services" such as counseling, testing, speech and hearing therapy,
and remedial instruction, might be overcome by the religious environment and
begin teaching religion, was held to be a primary effect that advanced religion.49
The risk that secular public services delivered in religious schools would be
perceived as a "symbolic union" of church and state was held to be a primary
effect that advanced religion.5 ° In the lower courts, turning on the lights for an
after-school religion club was held to be a primary effect that advanced relig-
ion.5 '
But this form of disaggregated neutrality is mostly of historical interest.
The Lemon test has been fundamentally reinterpreted, most dramatically in Zel-
52man v. Simmons-Harris, to focus directly on neutrality. Zelman is in principle
both formally and substantively neutral, but let me postpone that question for
now.
53
With increasing frequency, the Court has held that formal neutrality is
constitutionally sufficient but not constitutionally required. Thus, the Court
holds that legislatures may apply neutral and generally applicable regulation to
the exercise of religion5 4 (formal neutrality is permitted), or, within limits that
preclude discrimination among faiths and burdens on third parties, 55 legislatures
may grant regulatory exemptions 56 (an alternative to formal neutrality is also
49 Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385-89 (1985) (invalidating local funding of remedial and
enrichment courses taught by public school teachers in religious schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975) (invalidating federal funding for such auxiliary services). This holding in
Ball was partly overruled in Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235. This holding in Meek was not expressly
overruled, but it was the precedential basis for Ball and it is impossible to see how it can survive
Agostini.
50 Ball, 473 U.S. at 389-92.
51 Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) ("It would be entitled to use classroom space rent free, receive heat and light and would be
monitored by a paid faculty sponsor.").
52 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (upholding state-funded vouchers that could be used to pay for
educational services at a wide variety of schools, including public schools, secular private schools,
and religious private schools).
53 See infra text accompanying notes 108-109.
54 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990).
55 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-25 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
sales tax exemption exclusively for publications that promote a religion, at least where that ex-
emption is not found necessary to relieve a burden on the exercise of religion); Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708-11 (1985) (invalidating a law that gave employees an absolute
right to not work on their Sabbath and left no ability to consider any resulting burdens on the
employer or co-workers).
56 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-26 (2005) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge
to the prison provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-l(a) (2000)); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994) (quoting and reaffirm-
ing cases holding that governments may exempt religious practices from regulation); Smith, 494
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permitted). Courts may apply "neutral principles of law" to church property
disputes57 (formal neutrality is permitted), or they may defer to the highest
church authority recognized by both sides before the dispute arose58 (an alterna-
tive is also permitted). Legislatures may impose neutral and generally applica-
ble taxes on religious organizations 59 (formal neutrality is permitted), or, within
limits,6° they may grant tax exemptions 61 (an alternative is also permitted).
States may provide equal funding to secular and religious educational pro-
grams62 (formal neutrality is permitted), or, at least sometimes, they may fund
private secular education and refuse to fund private religious education 63 (an
alternative is also permitted).
These optional rules may be described as permissive formal neutrality-
formal neutrality is permitted but some alternative is also permitted. Permissive
formal neutrality may be contrasted with mandatory formal neutrality, in which
Congress and the states would be required to implement formal neutrality with
U.S. at 890 (stating that legislatures may exempt religious practices from regulation when not
constitutionally required to do so); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40
(1987) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to provision exempting religious institutions
from statutory ban on employment discrimination on the basis of religion); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to exemption
from truancy laws); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (rejecting Establishment Clause
challenge to exemption from requirement that workers seeking unemployment compensation be
available for Saturday work); Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (up-
holding exemption of kosher slaughter from general requirements of Federal Humane Slaughter
Act), affd mem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 357 S.W.2d 708,
710 (Ky. 1962) (upholding exemption from Sunday-closing laws of persons who observed a Sab-
bath other than Sunday), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 371 U.S. 218
(1962).
57 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,602-06 (1979).
58 Id. at 602 ("[A] State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property
disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters .... "), quoting Md. & Va.
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (emphasis by Justice Brennan); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 113-16
(1952) (constitutionalizing the common-law rule of deference to the highest church authority); see
also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-20 (1976) (requiring rule of
deference to highest church authority in cases of church personnel disputes).
59 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (upholding sales
tax as applied to sale of religious literature).
60 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
sales tax exemption exclusively for publications that promote a religion, at least where that ex-
emption is not found necessary to relieve a burden on the exercise of religion).
61 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-80 (1970) (upholding broadly inclusive property-
tax exemption for churches and other not-for-profit charitable organizations).
62 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (upholding state-funded vouchers
that could be used to pay for educational services at a wide variety of schools, including public
schools, secular private schools, and religious private schools).
63 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting Washington to exclude devotional theol-
ogy majors from a scholarship program available to any other accredited major).
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no alternatives permitted. Mandatory formal neutrality would prohibit regula-
tory exemptions, prohibit tax exemptions, prohibit deference to internal resolu-
tions of church disputes, and require equal funding for religious institutions.
Prominent academics have argued for mandatory formal neutrality,64 but it is
hardly surprising that the Court has shown no interest in a rule with such con-
troversial consequences.
The Court's permissive neutrality rules are some protection for religious
liberty, because the Court usually permits government to depart from formal
neutrality in only one direction. Religion cannot be singled out for discrimina-
tory regulation, taxation, or dispute resolution, and it cannot be singled out for
preferential funding. But these permissive neutrality rules also contain a large
measure of judicial minimalism and deference to majoritarian political proc-
esses: if two rules seem plausible to the Court, the legislature can choose.
I have noted four sets of rules in which formal neutrality is permitted
but not required. Three of these sets of rules may be restated somewhat differ-
ently: with respect to regulation, taxation, and resolution of church property
disputes, Congress and the states may choose either formal or substantive neu-
trality. Regulatory exemptions for religiously motivated behavior is generally
(not universally) substantively neutral for the reasons illustrated by the example
of children taking Communion wine 65 and discussed at length in my earlier
work:66 penalizing a religious practice is a substantial discouragement, but per-
mitting a religious practice does not encourage anyone not independently at-
tracted to it. So the Court's rule-that the legislature may grant or refuse ex-
emptions from neutral and generally applicable laws-means that the legislature
may choose between the two versions of neutrality.
Deference to the highest religious authority previously recognized by
both sides is substantively neutral, because it avoids government resolution of
internal religious disputes-and thus avoids a judgment that rewards one side
and rejects or penalizes the other-and it leaves these decisions in the religious
hands to which both sides originally committed them. Of course the rule of
deference also ends with a winner and a loser, but if the court simply identifies
the highest church authority and refrains from interpreting the church docu-
ments at the heart of the dispute, the decision for the secular court is usually
much simpler and much less substantive, and it presents much less opportunity
for manipulating the result. I think the Court's rule that secular courts may ei-
ther defer to the highest church authority or decide church disputes themselves
64 Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989
SuP. CT. REV. 373, 402 (concluding, after exploring pros and cons, that Supreme Court should
adopt Kurland's formal neutrality approach).
65 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
66 See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10-21; Lay-
cock, supra note 4, at 1013-18.
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under neutral principles of law means that state courts may choose either sub-
stantive or formal neutrality.
Tax exemptions are generally substantively neutral, at least as currently
implemented in most American jurisdictions, which exempt a broad range of
nonprofit organizations, including churches, schools, and charities. The incen-
tive to convert from for-profit status (taxed) to nonprofit status (tax exempt) is
balanced by a strong counter-incentive: conversion to nonprofit status forever
surrenders the right to distribute profits or return capital to the owners of the
enterprise.67 Within the set of nonprofits, there might be substantial effect on
religious incentives if secular schools and charities were exempt and religious
schools and charities were not (or vice versa). It would often be tempting to
increase or decrease the religious content in a school's curriculum or a charity's
program in an effort to qualify for the exemption. This would have been the
proper rationale for the Court's decision in Texas Monthly v. Bullock.68 Tax ex-
emption only for publications that "consist wholly" of religious teachings 69 dis-
criminated among speakers on the basis of their viewpoint, 70 and at the margin,
it encouraged publications with small amounts of secular content to eliminate it
and become "wholly" religious. Exempting both religious and secular nonprof-
its creates no such incentive.
The Court's fourth set of alternatives is very different. Equal funding
for religious and secular schools is formally neutral, and for reasons to be ex-
plained, I believe that it is also substantively neutral. Funding secular private
education but not religious private education is not neutral in either sense, but
the Court permits it anyway. 71 Funding secular private education but not reli-
gious private education creates a religious category (thus not formally neutral),
and it creates incentives to secularize religious education (thus not substantively
neutral), Joshua Davey could have gotten a state Promise Scholarship if he had
67 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring that tax-exempt organizations be "organized
and operated exclusively" for one or more tax-exempt purposes). An organization is not "organ-
ized ... exclusively" for exempt purposes unless its articles of incorporation provide that no as-
sets can ever be distributed to members or shareholders and that, on dissolution, its assets will be
distributed exclusively to another tax-exempt organization or to a government agency. 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4). See also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring that "no part of the net
earnings of [the organization] inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual...").
68 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating, in splintered opinions, sales tax exemption that applied only
to religious publications).
69 Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.312 (1982), quoted in id. at 5.
70 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that this was content
discrimination that violated the Free Press Clause). See generally Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-37 (1995) (reviewing and applying the rule that discrimi-
nation between different viewpoints is presumptively unconstitutional).
71 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting Washington to exclude devotional
theology majors from a scholarship program available to any other accredited major).
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studied theology from a secular perspective instead of a religious perspective.72
Some states offer state funding to colleges that become merely "sectarian," in-
stead of "pervasively sectarian. 73 In a state such as Maine, which pays tuition
for some students to attend secular private high schools but not religious private
high schools,74 a religious high school could qualify for funding if it would drop
its religious instruction. These incentive effects are strong, because students are
entirely free to respond to them by choosing another school, and schools are
also relatively free to respond to them: once an institution is running a school, it
is not difficult to augment or reduce the religious content in the curriculum.
The Court's first three sets of permissive neutrality rules, on regulation,
taxation, and dispute resolution, can thus be described as permitting states to
choose between formal and substantive neutrality. Locke v. Davey75 is the out-
lier; it permits states to choose between neutrality and discrimination against
religion. That is not how the Court has thought about its rules, but that is what it
has done.
C. Neutrality, Liberty, Voluntarism, and Separation
I never claimed or intended that substantive neutrality should be the
single explanation or only value of the Religion Clauses. To the contrary, my
whole purpose was to reconcile or unify distinct but tangled threads of explana-
tion for the Religion Clauses. I said that:
Because neutrality requires so much further specification, it
cannot be the only principle in the religion clauses. Nor can it
be the most fundamental. We must specify the content of neu-
trality by looking to other principles in the religion clauses.
When we have done that, neutrality should be defined in a way
that makes it largely congruent with those other principles. We
will often be able to explain the objection to a law by saying ei-
ther that it restricts the autonomy of religious belief or practice,
72 See id. at 716 (noting that ban on scholarships for theology majors applied only to "degrees
that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith,"' quoting briefs of both par-
ties).
73 Compare Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 498 (4th Cir. 2001) (summarizing
and rejecting the state's position), with Colorado Christian Univ. v. Baker, 2007 WL 1489801 (D.
Colo., May 18, 2007), appeal pending (reaching the opposite result on the basis of the intervening
decision in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)).
74 See Eulitt v. Maine, 386 F.3d 344, 353-57 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding this discrimination);
Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 60-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (same).
75 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that state can award scholarships to students in every accred-
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or that it threatens religious voluntarism, or that it deviates from
religious neutrality, and so on.76
Obviously the Religion Clauses are about religious liberty. We also say
that government should be neutral among religions and between religion and
nonreligion. We say religion should be voluntary. We say church and state
should be separate. We say that government should not aid religion. Sometimes
these different formulations point in the same direction; sometimes they seem to
point in opposite directions. Most importantly, regulation of religious practice
often restricts religious liberty, yet regulatory exemptions for religious practice
are often attacked as departures from neutrality. Do we have to choose between
liberty and neutrality, or is there an understanding of liberty and neutrality that
reconciles the two approaches?
I offered substantive neutrality as that reconciliation. Neutral incen-
tives, neither encouraging nor discouraging religion, is a coherent conception of
neutrality that is consistent with religious liberty and consistent with regulatory
exemptions for religious behavior. At the conceptual level, substantive neutral-
ity insists on minimizing government influence on religion. Minimizing gov-
ernment influence leaves religion maximally subject to private choice, thus
maximizing religious liberty. Carl Esbeck, whose work has emphasized the
importance of religious voluntarism, 77 has noted that voluntarism bears the same
relationship to government influence. "Voluntarism is not merely the absence
of official coercion. It is also the absence of the government's influence concern-
ing inherently religious beliefs and practices. 78  Substantive neutrality-
minimizing government influence on religious incentives-is thus an under-
standing of neutrality that is more consistent with religious liberty and religious
voluntarism than formal neutrality is. It was no doubt an oversimplification, but
in one early article I simply equated "substantive neutrality" with "liberty. 79
Later, I undertook to unite substantive neutrality with separation, and
more audaciously, to do so in the context of what was then called charitable
choice-government payments for social services delivered by religious provid-
ers. 80 Of course that provoked objections; 81 maybe it was a bridge too far.82 I
76 Laycock, supra note 4, at 998.
77 See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1385, 1395-1401; Esbeck, supra note 11, at 63-67.
78 Esbeck, supra note 11, at 64.
79 Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 841, 848 (1992).
80 See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 5.
81 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1073 & n.7 (2002) ("Laycock eliminates the tension between separation and
neutrality only by begging the question whether religious belief and activity merit special consti-
tutional protection."); Smith, Separation, supra note 14, at 227 (calling the argument "ingenious
(and perhaps too clever)").
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agree that neutrality of any kind-either formal or substantive-is inconsistent
with the goals of the legal and political movement that has most emphatically
claimed the banner of separationism. 83 I did not mean to claim otherwise.
What I did claim was that the Supreme Court had never set up separa-
tionism in opposition to neutrality. It had always talked of both, and in its own
not-very-theoretical way, it had assumed that separation and neutrality were
84consistent. Recall that the Lemon test, the very symbol of strict separationism,
incorporates verbatim an earlier definition of "wholesome neutrality. 85 The
assumption that neutrality and separation are opposites is a product of the last
twenty years, a time when conservative justices used the language of neutrality
to uphold government financial aid to religious schools, a result that most sepa-
rationists opposed. Where Lemon had found a departure from neutrality in any
aid that might benefit a school's religious mission,86 the Court's new majority
found neutrality in the fact that aid flowed on similar terms to religious and
secular schools alike.87 This argument over neutrality versus separation has
extended to arguments over free speech, with separationists losing their argu-
ment that private religious speech may be or must be excluded from public fo-
82 See CORNELIUS RYAN, A BRIDGE Too FAR (1974) (recounting the unsuccessful Allied at-
tempt to capture the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem, in the Netherlands, at a time when several
major streams, and thus several bridges, still lay between the Allied front lines and the bridge at
Arnhem).
83 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MIcH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001) (equating separationism with two propositions: "that public
aid should not go to religious schools and that public schools should not be religious..."); Ira C.
Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 230-31 (1994) (offer-
ing these two propositions as the "most concrete, operational meaning" of a somewhat more com-
plex underlying idea of separationism); see also Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Sepa-
ration, 70 U. Cif. L. REV. 1667, 1687-94 (2003) (surveying competing meanings of separation).
84 See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 5, at 53-65 (reviewing the cases and the con-
flicting pressures on the Court).
85 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (paraphrasing School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222.(1963)). Lemon cites Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), but the
cited passage in Allen is a quotation from Schempp, where the formulation originated.
86 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 ("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion ....") (emphasis added).
87 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (upholding state-funded
vouchers that could be used to pay for educational services at a wide variety of schools, including
public schools, secular private schools, and religious private schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793, 829-36 (plurality opinion) (upholding loans of educational equipment on per capita basis to
all schools that chose to participate, including religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
222-35 (1997) (upholding federal program that provided remedial instruction to low income stu-
dents in both secular and religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
8-14 (1993) (rejecting argument that Establishment Clause prohibits government-paid sign-
language interpreter for deaf student in Catholic high school); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
396-404 (1983) (upholding state income-tax deductions for educational expenses, including tui-
tion paid to religious schools).
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rums.88 But even over the last twenty years, Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test was a measure of neutrality-government should not endorse any position
either pro or con about religion 89-that produced separationist results with re-
spect to government speech endorsing religious views. 90
Back when the Court talked about separation, it assumed that separation
protects religious liberty. On what understanding of separation would that make
any sense? In setting the question up in this way, I was of course reflecting my
own separationist history and my reluctance to give up the label. I have been
inconsistent over the years about separation. 91 When thinking about how I
would use separation, I like it. When thinking about how some folks have mis-
used the same word, I tend to find "separation" fatally ambiguous.
Once when I was focused on my own view of separation, I suggested
that on one plausible understanding, the fundamental purpose of separation is to
separate private religious choices and commitments from governmental power.
92
On that understanding, separation is congruent with religious liberty, because it
leaves religious choices to individuals. It is consistent with voluntarism for the
same reason: people will participate in religious activities only when they vol-
untarily choose to do so. And it is consistent with substantive neutrality: sepa-
rating religious choice from government influence minimizes government influ-
ence on religious choice.
88 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-20 (2001) (protecting right of
student religion club to meet in elementary school on equal terms with secular clubs); Rosenber-
ger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-46 (1995) (protecting right of reli-
gious magazine to receive funding from student activity fees on equal terms with secular publica-
tions); Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-70 (1995) (protecting
right to erect cross in public forum on capitol grounds); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390-97 (1993) (protecting right of church to meet in public school
on equal terms with other community groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-77 (1981)
(protecting right of student religion club to meet on university campus on equal terms with secular
clubs).
89 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("What is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
90 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-81 (2005) (invalidating Ten Com-
mandments display in county courthouse on grounds that county's purpose in mounting the dis-
play was inconsistent with the government's obligation of neutrality toward religion); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306-08 (2000) (holding that prayer as part of official pro-
gram at high school football games unconstitutionally endorses religion); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 627, 631 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that school-sponsored prayer at high
school graduation, invalidated by Court on grounds that school coerced students to participate,
was also invalid on ground that it endorsed religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 592-94, 598-602 (1989) (holding that nativity scene in courthouse unconstitutionally en-
dorsed religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (holding that moment-of-silence
law unconstitutionally endorsed religion).
91 See Laycock, supra note 83, at 1700 (collecting my own inconsistent statements about
whether separation is a usable concept).
92 Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 5, at 46.
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At a conceptual level, this is a perfectly sensible understanding of sepa-
ration. But it is different from lack of contact between church and state as an
end in itself, and different from separation as no aid to religion. That difference
leaves two possibilities for the dispute over financial aid to education and social
services provided by religious institutions. Either one side or the other has made
a mistaken judgment about how the unified principle of liberty, voluntarism,
separation, and substantive neutrality applies to the funding issue, or both sides
are right about their own principles and separation is ultimately at odds with
religious liberty and voluntarism understood in terms of substantive neutrality.
One could continue this march of conceptual unification and try to make
the principal of no aid to religion fit with all the rest. The claim would have to
be that the aid we are talking about when we say no aid to religion is aid that is
preferentially directed to religion, and that the no-aid principle does not include
aid that is neutrally distributed to religious and nonreligious providers of the
same services. Or we might say that so long as the government gets full secular
value for its money, from religious and secular providers on equal terms, its
activity is more akin to a purchase of services than to a distribution of aid. If the
government can buy a case of wine from a monastery on competitive terms,
why can it not buy a math course or the services of a homeless shelter from a
religious organization? To fold no-aid into neutrality in this way would not be
objectively wrong, and it might conceivably help a few folks who were chang-
ing their minds anyway to reconcile their old no-aid principles with their new
tolerance for government funding, but I think it would be a mistake. It would
leave us with no vocabulary to describe a position with a long and important
history in American debates. Some people believe that no government should
aid religion in any way, and that this principle trumps all competing principles,
including nondiscrimination principles. "No aid" is a sensible way to talk about
that idea, and we should preserve the phrase for that use.
III. LAYCOCK AND FELDMAN
Noah Feldman and I did not start out from the same point analytically,
but we started out from about the same place on the political spectrum concern-
ing these issues. We are both centrists in important but somewhat different
senses.
I am a centrist in the sense that I am equally concerned for the religious
liberty of all, believers and nonbelievers. Many activists and judges, and some
scholars, address these issues only with a view to helping or opposing the reli-
gious side in general, or helping or opposing conservative Christians in particu-
lar.93 My ideal is that one's views on religion should not predict one's views on
religious liberty, and that every American, of every shade of religious belief and
93 See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 159-61 (reviewing positions of inter-
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disbelief, is entitled to the same protection from government interfering with, or
attempting to influence, his views about religion.
Professor Feldman may well share the view that every American of
whatever belief is equally entitled to religious liberty. I do not know, but I
would be surprised if he disagreed with that. But fundamentally, he is a centrist
in the quite different sense of looking for compromise. He is trying to pull a
divided nation together.94 I would like to do that too, but we proceeded in quite
different ways.
My approach has been to try to figure out what each side in the culture
wars is justly entitled to in principle. Feldman's approach is more political. He
identifies two large social movements, which he calls legal secularists and val-
ues evangelicals. 95 He is explicitly trying to broker a deal between them.
96
Steven Gey is not a centrist in my judgment, although he has told me
orally that I am wrong about that. Professor Gey is a strong legal secularist in
terms of Feldman's categories, a strict no-aid separationist, staunchly opposed to
any form of government support for religion.97 Unlike Feldman, Gey is not
looking for compromise. He wants his side to win and the other side to lose.
But Gey and Feldman agree with each other, and disagree with me, on
one important point. They both think that current Establishment Clause law is
an unprincipled contradiction. The current case law in the Supreme Court con-
tinues to sharply restrict government speech endorsing religion, especially in
public schools.98 Indeed, the formal doctrine is still that government must be
neutral between religion and nonreligion, even in its speech. 99 There are excep-
tions in which the Court has applied a different rule,10° or in which the Court's
swing voter found that a plainly religious statement did not endorse religion. 101
94 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 16 ("1 undertook this book in the spirit of seeking reconcilia-
tion between the warring factions that define the church-state debate .... ").
95 See id. at 150-85 (describing legal secularists); id. at 186-219 (describing values evangeli-
cals).
96 See id. at 235-36 ("[A] workable solution to our church-state problem must reconcile secu-
larists and evangelicals by making both sides feel included in the experiment of American gov-
ernment and nationhood.").
97 See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMDT. L. REV. 1, 5-12
(2006) (summarizing his understanding of church-state separation).
98 See cases cited supra note 90.
99 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (stating, in a case about a pas-
sive religious display, that "[t]he touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the 'First Amend-
ment mandates government neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."') (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
100 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S 783, 786-95 (1983) (permitting legislative chaplain to open
daily sessions with prayer because the First Congress had the same practice).
101 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding that the
Ten Commandments display on the grounds of the Texas capitol conveyed a mixed religious and
secular message and that the historic lack of controversy suggested that the secular message had
dominated in public perception); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
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But the big picture, until and unless new Justices change the rules, is one of sub-
stantial restrictions on government speech endorsing or attacking religion.
In sharp contrast, at least from a culture wars perspective, government
can send apparently unlimited amounts of money to religious schools through
voucher programs.10 2 This is so obviously a contradiction to Feldman and Gey
that they mostly just assert it.10 3 Unless I missed it in another article somewhere
else, Feldman sees no possible argument for reconciling these two positions that
is worth taking time to rebut. Gey explores a little further, but never actually
considers the one argument that might reconcile these two positions. 4
The Court took this combination of positions because justices Kennedy
and O'Connor took this combination of positions.10 5 They never saw any con-
tradiction, so they never explained how their positions fit together. But it is not
difficult to make sense of their intuitions. With respect to the Establishment
Clause, substantive neutrality and the protection of individual choice in religious
matters can explain their votes. I confine this claim to the Establishment
Clause, because with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Kennedy went
off in a very different direction.1°6
Consider first the Court's voucher decision, Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.0 7 The details of Cleveland's program were messy, and details matter.
A choice program can be implemented well or badly, and if implemented badly,
concurring) (finding that a nativity scene accompanied by Santa Claus, reindeer, candy-striped
poles, and more did not endorse Christianity).
102 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (upholding state-funded vouchers
that could be used to pay for educational services at a wide variety of schools, including public
schools, secular private schools, and religious private schools).
103 FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 215-16 ("What we have, then, is a contradiction... [N]o single,
unified theory or logical reason can explain the arrangements we now have."); Gey, supra note 19,
at 774 ("The problem is that the bodies of doctrine that underlie these two Establishment
Clauses-the separationist clause governing endorsement and the neutrality clause governing
financing-are intrinsically and comprehensively inconsistent.")
104 See Gey, supra note 19, at 774-76. Gey considers the argument that school prayer with
student elections is neutral in the sense that all viewpoints can compete, but he never considers the
argument that the resulting prayer imposes a collective choice on everyone while each use of a
voucher implements an individual choice. I suppose he would say taxation to fund the voucher
imposes a collective choice on everyone. For my view of the grievance of taxpayers paying for
educational choices that include religious choices, see infra text following note 178.
105 Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 641 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., joining opinion of the Court
upholding vouchers), and id. at 663-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring), with Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 292 (2000) (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., joining opinion of the Court striking
down school-sponsored prayer at high school football games).
106 Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873 (1990) (Kennedy, J., joining opin-
ion of the Court holding that burdens on religious practice require no justification if imposed by
laws that are neutral and generally applicable), with id. at 891-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphatically rejecting that view).
107 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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it may not provide the choice it promises. I will take up a few of these details
below, 10 8 but for now, let us assume reasonable implementation.
The principle of the voucher decision is both formally neutral and sub-
stantively neutral. The state pays for education that satisfies the compulsory
education requirements-math, reading, science, history, etc.-and it pays for
that education at any school the parents choose, public or private, religious or
secular. This law is formally neutral, because there are no religious categories
in the program. It is also substantively neutral, because it creates no incentives
to choose religious or secular education. You get the same government subsidy
either way. As always, substantive neutrality protects individual choice; each
family can choose for itself which school to attend.
In terms of minimizing government interference with private religious
choices, this is a huge improvement over the traditional public school monop-
oly. Traditionally, the states have sa;d that here is five, eight, even ten thousand
dollars a year that we will spend on your child's education-if you choose a
thoroughly secular education in a public school. You also have a constitutional
right to choose a religious education,' °9 but if you choose that, you forfeit all
this money. That threatened forfeiture vigorously discourages any parent in-
clined to choose the religious alternative; it creates a huge distortion of the con-
stitutionally protected choice between religious and secular education. A pro-
gram that offered the same state funding no matter what school a family chooses
would be substantively neutral and would protect private choice in religious
matters.
Now consider a school-sponsored prayer at the opening of every class,
or at every meeting of the school board, or at every graduation ceremony. This
is not substantively neutral. Government is taking a whole series of positions on
religion: that there is a God, that praying to God is a good thing, that all stu-
dents are encouraged to join in prayer, that the form of prayer offered at the
school is a good or efficacious way to pray-maybe the best way to pray. There
are many forms and styles of prayer, but each school-sponsored prayer will be a
particular form and in a particular style. The odds are that over the course of a
year, all or most of the school's prayers will be in the same form and style. The
government endorses all these positions, both general and specific, and encour-
ages all to participate.
And there is no individual choice. The school makes a series of collec-
tive decisions and imposes those decisions on everyone. Whether to pray, how
to pray, whom to pray to-in Jesus' name or not?-all these choices are made
by state actors and their choices are imposed on everyone in the room. Every-
one in the room will either participate in the particular prayer the school or its
appointed agent selected, or they will conspicuously not participate while eve-
t08 See infra text accompanying notes 181-191.
109 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating law requiring all children
to attend public schools).
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ryone else prays, or they will conspicuously leave the room and return when the
prayer is over. Everyone is pushed to join in a particular form of prayer, and
effective individual choice is eliminated.
The short version of this extended comparison is that money can be de-
livered in a way that is consistent with individual choice. Prayers cannot. Nei-
ther can scriptures, creeds, Christmas displays, or any other government speech
promoting or denigrating religion." 0
A second important difference between money and prayer is relevant
here, although the Court has neglected the point."' When the government pays
for education, it gets full secular value for its money. It pays for courses that
satisfy the compulsory education requirements. When it supports a broad range
of schools, it supports education in secular subjects and lets parents choose
whether to add religion to the curriculum. But when government adds a reli-
gious observance to a meeting or ceremony, there is no secular value added.
Government is verbally supporting religion as religion.
So what does Professor Feldman say about this comparison between fi-
nancial support for education in religious schools, on the one hand, and gov-
ernment-sponsored religious speech on the other? As I said, Feldman has al-
most exactly the opposite proposal. He would have the Court tighten up on fi-
nancial support for religiously-affiliated institutions, including for religious
schools. 1 2 And he would have the Court loosen up on verbal support for relig-
ion, letting government endorse religious teachings and sponsor religious dis-
plays.1 3 I frankly cannot tell how far he would go with this. He says he would
abandon the secular purpose requirement and the endorsement test, and substi-
tute the simple principle of "no coercion and no money."' 14
But he never explains his understanding of coercion. Does he accept
something like the Court's view that religious ceremonies at public events inher-
ently coerce those in attendance? 15  Or Justice Scalia's view that coercion
110 See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 156-58 (elaborating this distinction).
Ill The Court's theory is that the choice of a religious school or major is an "independent and
private choice" that breaks "the link" to government funds. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719
(2004). This theory implies that the religious content of the student's choice is no longer relevant.
Surely there are some limits to this reasoning, but the Court has not yet found any. For analysis,
see Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 167-71.
112 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 237, 244-48.
13 See id. at 237-44.
114 Id. at 238.
115 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("Even if we regard every
high school student's decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are never-
theless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those
present to participate in an act of religious worship."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 593 (1992)
("[P]ublic pressure, as well as peer pressure .... though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion."); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) ("When the power, prestige
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
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means only "coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of
law and threat of penalty"?'16  He never says. Would he permit school-
sponsored prayer in classrooms? Or only at special events like graduations? Or
would he permit only passive displays like Nativity scenes and Ten Command-
ments monuments? I don't know. But on the central thrust, his proposal is the
opposite of mine.
On what grounds? So far as I can tell, Feldman has no legal principle
that generates both of these results. He says money for religious schools but no
verbal support for religious belief is a contradiction, 1 7 apparently because the
issue in both contexts is whether government can support religion. When he
reverses both results, permitting verbal support but prohibiting financial support,
presumably he still thinks it is a contradiction. So what is he doing?
Actually, Feldman appears to be doing two rather different things, or
perhaps acting on two different motivations. First, he is trying to broker a po-
litical compromise, and second, independent of whether it leads to compromise,
he seems to think that pushing both sides to moderate their positions is a good
thing.
Feldman's argument for compromise is also two-fold. One argument for
his compromise is that he thinks it gives each side what it cares about most, or at
least what each side should care about most. He thinks that secularists are sim-
ply choosing to feel excluded by government endorsements of religion; they
should choose to feel differently." 8 There is an echo here of the Supreme
Court's old view that African-Americans were simply choosing to feel stigma-
tized by segregation." 9 The tangible harm of segregation was of course much
greater than the tangible harm of Christian prayers at government events,"20 but
the government's declaration of preference for one race over others in segrega-
tion was no more real or unambiguous than the government's declaration of
preference for one religious belief over others in a government-sponsored reli-
gious ceremony.
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved plan
is plain." (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962))).
116 Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 215-16.
118 See id. at 238-39 ("Talk can always be reinterpreted, and more talk can always be added, so
religious speech and symbols need not exclude.")..
119 See id. at 242 ("[It is largely an interpretive choice to feel excluded by the fact of other
people's faith," even when-this is the context of his statement-the government is promoting
that faith). Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (arguing that if segregation be a
badge of inferiority, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the col-
ored race chooses to put that construction upon it.").
120 See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957) (analyzing the
economic consequences of discrimination); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segrega-
tion Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960) (describing the consequences of the system of racial
segregation in the American South).
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On the voucher issue, Feldman says that evangelicals have made little
use of educational vouchers so far, because they have not been able to enact
generally applicable voucher plans.12 1 He also predicts, no doubt correctly, that
evangelicals would not like some of the other schools that would get money
under a voucher plan' 22 -think Islamic schools, Hare Krishna schools, or left-
wing anti-American schools. For both these reasons, he thinks that evangelicals
should be able to give up vouchers.
He does not put it this way, but a reader might reasonably infer that he
thinks that legal secularists care most about money and that values evangelicals
care most about symbolism. I frankly do not know what each side cares about
most. But I suspect that each side cares so deeply about both issues that no
compromise is going to be acceptable until and unless imposed on both sides
and established by long usage.
Feldman's failure to specify what he means by coercion creates fatal
ambiguity at the heart of his proposed compromise. If he is putting school-
sponsored prayer or religious instruction back in public-school classrooms, co-
ercion is inevitable. Children will be forced-by teachers who do not know the
rules or dislike the rules they know, by intense social pressure from other chil-
dren, and sometimes by direct intimidation123 -to join in religious observances
or to at least go through all the outwardly visible motions of religious obser-
vances. And parents who object to their children being subjected to somebody
else's prayer service feel very strongly about that objection.
Alternatively, if Feldman is permitting only passive displays and no
government-led religious ceremonies, he is not giving the values evangelicals
more than a few crumbs. They are not going to take a deal in which they get no
money for their private schools, a public school system as secular as ever, but a
free hand on Nativity scenes and Ten Commandments monuments. A major
part of his argument is that he offers a grand deal that is actually achievable, but
this egregiously one-sided version is obviously a non-starter.
Feldman emphasizes that by abolishing Lemon's secular purpose re-
quirement, 124 he also would give values evangelicals a free hand to make their
religious arguments in the political process. 125 I fully agree that no law should
121 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 248 ("Given that voucher programs are widely underused
and have not spread widely, it should be relatively easy for values evangelicals to abandon
them.").
122 See id. at 245-46 ("[W]hile values evangelicalism claims to advocate national unity and
inclusion through shared values, school voucher programs cut exactly the other way, promoting
difference and nonengagement.").
123 See Walter v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169, 1170-73 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (quot-
ing testimony of Jewish child accosted for not appearing to pray during moment of silence, who
was told that he would go to hell and that the Jews killed Christ, and of Catholic child who feared
that if he did not stand and pray, he would get in trouble with his teacher).
124 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 237.
125 See id. at 222-27.
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be held unconstitutional because its supporters made a religious argument. 16
But clarifying this point would give the evangelicals little that they don't already
have. They have the right to make their religious arguments in the political
process;127 the political arena is full of religious arguments and full of appeals to
religious voters. As far as the law is concerned, churches can even create politi-
cal affiliates and political action committees, 128 although they choose not do so,
probably for good religious and political reasons.
"The Court has never accepted in any context the view that religious ar-
guments are excluded from or restricted in political debate."' 129 The secular pur-
pose requirement does not lead to invalidation of laws to promote sexual moral-
ity,13° restrict abortions, close stores on Sunday, 132 or any other religiously-
motivated law that falls short of promoting or mandating a religious ritual or
observance. That a law coincides with some religious group's moral teachings
does not make it unconstitutional. 33 The Court has relied on the secular purpose
requirement in only a handful of cases, most of which-quite possibly all of
which--could have been decided the same way on other grounds.1 34 The claim
that religious arguments have no place in politics is mostly an academic argu-
ment, occasionally a political argument, but it is not the law and never has been
the law. Clarifying the point might reassure some evangelicals, but this is an-
other crumb, not a substantial gain.
Feldman's second argument for his compromise is that it would return
us to the solution that prevailed through much of our history. 135 This is some
truth to this claim, but the history to which it appeals is not very attractive. It is
certainly true that at the founding, the controversy was over financial support for
126 See Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 793, 811-12 (1996) (urging that judicial review focus on political outputs-the
content and consequences of legislation-and not political inputs-the arguments made in support
of that legislation).
127 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating provision that excluded members
of the clergy from the legislature); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) ("Of course,
churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have [the] right" to "take strong positions
on public issues.").
128 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that these
alternatives eliminate any burden on free exercise from the restrictions on political speech by
charities organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)).
129 Laycock, supra note 126, at 797.
130 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding Adolescent Family Life Act).
131 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding restrictions on public funding of abor-
tions).
132 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws).
133 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 604 n.8; Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20; McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
134 See supra note 46 (collecting cases).
135 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 236-37 ("I believe that the history of church and state in
America that I have offered in these pages does point toward an answer.").
2007]
25
Laycock: Substantive Neutrality Revisited
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
churches and the salaries of clergy. 136 Prayer and religious ceremonies at gov-
ernment events did not become controversial until the nineteenth century. 37 For
most of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, there were Protes-
tant religious ceremonies in the public schools; 138 children were coerced to par-
ticipate, by corporal punishment if necessary;' 39 and there was no money for
private alternatives for children of other faiths.1 n° The Protestants argued that
their religious observances in public schools were "nonsectarian," because they
simply read the Bible "without note or comment," and thus they took no posi-
tion on issues that divided different Christian denominations. 41 Non-Christians
did not count, and the Catholic view-that the Bible should be read only in a
translation approved by the hierarchy and only when accompanied by the offi-
cial interpretations of the magisterium--didn't count either.
142
Feldman is proposing some version of this nineteenth-century Protestant
practice-majoritarian religious observances at government events, and no
money for private schools. He does not appear to require a pretense or fig leaf
of nonsectarianism. His rejection of coercion means he is not really going back
to the nineteenth-century practice. His failure to define coercion affects his his-
torical argument, too. If he would permit only passive religious displays, but
not religious exercises in classrooms, he is not even approximating any practice
from the American past. If he would restore religious exercise to public school
classrooms, then the difference between his proposal and the nineteenth-century
practice would be in the degree of coercion.
The corollary of moving back toward practices that prevailed through
much of our history is that his proposal seeks to reverse the historical trend of
the last generation on both issues. I do not think the changes of the last genera-
136 See Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid, supra note 2, at 913-19 (contrasting the founding
generation's treatment of financial and nonfinancial aid to religion).
137 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 57-92 (reviewing the nineteenth-century battles over relig-
ion in public schools); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 83, at 297-305 (describing "The Protestant
Establishment" and its nineteenth-century conflict with Catholic immigrants); Douglas Laycock,
"Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 50-53 (1991) (summarizing the same developments and collecting additional
sources).
138 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 61-65, 87-88; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 83, at 298-99.
139 See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854) (dismissing, without reaching the merits of the
underlying controversy, father's claim for damages caused by child being expelled from public
school for refusing to read the King James Bible); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417
(Boston Police Ct. 1859) (dismissing prosecution of a teacher who beat a Catholic student with a
stick for thirty minutes until he agreed to read or recite from the King James translation of the
Bible); CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
1760-1860, at 171 (1983) (reporting a similar case in Oswego, New York).
140 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 66, 86-87; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 83, at 300-02.
141 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 61-62; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 83, at 298-99, 301.
142 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 63-67; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 83, at 299-300.
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tion were just mistakes or random variations in doctrine. The nineteenth-century
Protestant practice was appalling, and we abandoned it for good reason.
I have already explained why the Kennedy-O'Connor position-
prohibiting government speech observing or endorsing religion but permitting
government to fund programs of private choice that include religiously-affiliated
providers of education, social services, medical care, and the like-is consistent
with substantive neutrality and individual choice. 143 The two halves of that posi-
tion emerged at somewhat different times and coincided with important changes
in American attitudes toward religious minorities. The first Supreme Court deci-
sions prohibiting school-sponsored prayer,144 in 1962 and 1963, came at a time
of growing religious pluralism and full assimilation of Catholics and Jews into
the American mainstream. 145 When the Court began to take religious minorities
seriously after World War H, majoritarian religious ceremonies at public events,
and especially in public schools, looked less and less tolerable.
The shift to permitting funding of religious schools began in the 1980s,
gathered momentum in the 1990s, and came to fruition at the turn of the millen-
nium. 46 In the 1980s, the evangelicals switched sides on this issue, moving
from intense opposition to intense support. 47 Free marketeers making economic
arguments for school choice became much more numerous and got more atten-
tion in a political environment more interested in market solutions. 148 In the
1960s and 1970s, religious schools had been actual or potential refuges from
desegregation, 49 but by the 1990s, frustrated black parents in inner cities were
demanding school choice. 50 As this broad coalition joined Catholics in demand-
143 See supra text accompanying notes 105-110.
144 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
145 See generally WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT - CATHOLIC - JEW (1955) (arguing that by the
1950s, these three religions had come to constitute three accepted branches of the American civil
religion). The first Catholic President was elected in 1960.
146 See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 166 (collecting cases).
147 See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 5, at 58-59 (describing evangelical opposition to
funding for religious schools in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and continuing up to
1980).
148 In the online catalog of the main libraries of the University of Michigan,
http://mirlyn.lib.umich.edu, there were 195 entries when I searched for "school choice" as a
phrase in the subject matter index on September 24, 2007. The earliest entry was published in
1976. Four were published in the 1970s, 14 in the 1980s, 90 in the 1990s, and 87 between 2000
and 2007.
149 See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 5, at 61-62 (briefly describing the segregation
academies and the desegregation claim in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
150 See William G. Howell et. al, What Americans Think About Their Schools: The 2007 Educa-
tion Next-PEPG Survey, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2007, at 12. This article reports a survey in which 68%
of African-Americans completely or somewhat favored the use of "government funds to pay the
tuition of low-income students who choose to attend private schools." Id. at 17. See also THOMAS
C. PEDRONI, MARKET MOVEMENTS: AFRICAN AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL VOUCHER
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ing money for private schools, and as Protestant hostility to Catholics faded
further into the past, aid to private schools looked less like a special interest
demand for Catholics; it became much easier to see the issue in terms of neutral-
ity and private choice.
Feldman's nineteenth-century model was a Protestant model that im-
posed Protestant preferences on both issues-on government speech and on
government money.15' Both halves of the nineteenth-century Protestant model
were deeply rooted in anti-Catholicism. Anti-Catholic feeling has faded, but the
problem with the nineteenth-century model is more general. The Protestant
model served a nineteenth-century anti-Catholic agenda because-precisely
because-both halves of that solution catered to the religious majority and over-
rode the needs and views of religious minorities. The changes of the past sixty
years on these two issues represent progress toward greater tolerance and equal-
ity; it would be a mistake to roll back the clock on either issue.
Feldman's second reason for his proposal, his desire to push all sides
toward the middle, is more subtly stated. Only on rereading Feldman did I real-
ize that this was part of his argument. But I think it is a more fundamental
source of our disagreement. Feldman and I come to opposite solutions on both
sets of concrete issues because we make opposite judgments on a more funda-
mental question: how can Americans live together in peace and equality despite
our deep religious differences? My answer to that question is to maximize reli-
gious liberty for each American. I want to minimize government influence on
religious choices and commitments-this is the very definition of substantive
neutrality-and let each American live his life as freely as possible in accord
with his own beliefs and commitments. Feldman does not. His solution is to
push us all to take more moderate positions, reducing the scope of liberty or
leaning on us not to fully exercise the liberties we have.
Values evangelicals very much want government sponsorship for relig-
ion, so Feldman says that legal secularists should swallow their objections.' 5 2 It
is not so bad to see religious displays on government walls, and although he is
ambiguous on this, he may think it is not so bad to have to sit quietly through
someone else's prayer service. The public school monopoly encourages a "co-
hesive national identity that evangelicals have wanted to restore or re-create";
53
vouchers are bad because they empower groups that want to teach other tradi-
tions or other identities, and they will inevitably provoke political battles about
whether some schools are too radical or un-American to be funded. 54 He thinks
we will get along better if we all moderate our views and reduce our differences.
I think that is unlikely to happen. We always will have an extraordinary
diversity of religious opinions, including fire-breathing believers and fire-
151 See supra text accompanying notes 135-142.
152 See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 238-42.
153 Id. at 244.
154 See id. at 245-46.
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breathing nonbelievers. Given that reality, we will get along better if we agree
to leave each other alone with respect to our beliefs and commitments about
religion. The virtues of leaving each other alone are nicely illustrated by the
difference between classroom prayer, which was deeply polarizing, and the
Equal Access Act, 155 which enables thousands of student prayer clubs (and gay
rights clubs) to meet on their own time without imposing on their classmates.
Whatever the relative merits of competing empirical predictions about the pos-
sibility of moderating religious conflict, I think that liberty with respect to reli-
gious matters is both intrinsically valuable 56 and a deeply rooted constitutional
commitment. My solution seeks to maximize liberty; Feldman's solution seeks
to constrain the exercise of liberty and to encourage moderation.
Professor Feldman and I recently had an exchange at Harvard that clari-
fied our differences and clarified some of the positions in his book. Of course he
should not be held responsible for my attempts to summarize his informal oral
remarks. But the exchange was sufficiently revealing to deserve summary here.
He agrees that he failed to specify what he meant by coercion. He now
says that, for everyone who is not an elementary school student, he means Jus-
tice Scalia's understanding of coercion. So after elementary school, people
would indeed have to sit through other people's religious exercises at govern-
ment events. Many people complain to him about having been subjected to
government-sponsored prayers, but none of the complainers was ever converted
and many report being strengthened in their own faith in reaction to the unpleas-
ant experience. He thinks that government-sponsored religious exercises deliver
no message about the truth or value of any religion, but simply a message that
one religion is the choice of a local majority-an uncontroversial fact that eve-
ryone already knows.
More fundamentally, he sees no difference between a majority exer-
cising its religion privately or through the organs of government, because he
thinks the state action doctrine is a laughable fetish. By contrast, I think that
state action is definitional in the Religion Clauses: the difference between pro-
tected free exercise and prohibited establishment is precisely the presence or
absence of state action in a religious ritual or activity. The difference is as clear
as day and night-including cases of dusk, where the presence of state action is
debatable and cases on either side of the line do not seem very different from
each other. But we must draw the line as best we can, in close cases as well as
easy cases, or the Religion Clauses become incoherent.
Feldman's definition of coercion clarifies what evangelicals would get
from his proposed compromise. They would get prayer at football games,
Christmas carols without a legal cloud, more religion-friendly perceptions from
administrators, and the like. Presumably they would get prayer in classrooms as
155 20 U.S.C. § 4071-74 (2000).
156 See Laycock, Liberty, supra note 5, at 316-23 (arguing that religious liberty reduces conflict
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well, at least after elementary school. He does not want a quarter of the popula-
tion to feel that the public schools are a hostile environment.
Feldman also emphasizes that evangelicals would get intelligent de-
sign and creationism in public schools, taught not as science but as a theological
belief widely held in the American population. Feldman and I agree that under
existing law, schools could do much more than they do to accommodate reli-
gious objections to evolution. They could teach more about the boundaries of
science and the difference between naturalism as a method of inquiry (a method
that defines the reach of science) and naturalism as an ultimate truth (a question
for religion or philosophy), thus making clear that science simply does not ad-
dress any question about the role of God in causing or directing evolution or in
creating the evidence that supports evolution. Perhaps schools would feel freer
to take these steps if they were free to teach religion. But if schools were free to
teach religion, they could teach intelligent design and creationism as true. If not
-if Feldman means only that schools could teach that many people believe in
intelligent design or creationism-then again he has changed nothing, because
schools clearly can teach sociological or demographic facts about what many
Americans believe. Whatever schools might teach about intelligent design and
creationism under Feldman's proposal, he thought that it should not be taught in
a science class. But that would seem to be merely a pedagogical preference; if
schools are constitutionally free to teach something, it is hard to see any consti-
tutional reason why they can teach it in one class but not in another.
With respect to money, he thinks politics is about money and not
symbolism, and that the wars of religion and lesser forms of religious conflict
were about money and institutional control, not about symbolism. The point
here seemed to be that if money goes to religious institutions, we will fight
about it. This formulation is also open to the interpretation that he proposes
victory for the secularists on what is important-money-and victory for the
evangelicals on what is not important-symbolism.
My exchange with Professor Feldman was friendly and clarifying for
both of us, but neither of us made much progress toward persuading the other.
For me, the fundamental fact continues to be that money can be distributed to
individuals and used consistently with individual choice, but that a religious
exercise at a government event imposes on everyone present the religious exer-
cise and all the religious choices inevitably contained within it.
IV. LAYCOCK AND GEY
Professor Gey has a more traditional objection. He wants neither finan-
cial nor verbal support for anything connected to religion. To him, separation
means no government aid to any religiously-affiliated organization and a com-
pletely secular environment in any place even touching on the governmental
sphere.1 57 He would go further, "prohibiting accommodation of religiously man-
157 See Gey, supra note 97, at 5-12.
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dated behavior beyond the scope of religious expression,"'' 58 refusing to allow
regulatory exemptions even when an exemption would permit believers to prac-
tice their faith and would impose no cost on those around them.' 59 He believes
that the Establishment Clause limits the free speech rights of religious speak-
ers. 16 He may be the only American religious liberty scholar to defend the
French decision to prohibit students from wearing conspicuous religious dress
or symbols in public schools. 16 1 The sum of these positions is why I do not think
of him as a centrist.
It is no surprise that he opposes government money flowing to religious
schools, even if they teach all the secular subjects and even if the money is
routed through parents who choose from a broad array of schools. 162 He is con-
cerned about the conscience of taxpayers who object to these religious schools.
In his view, if I do not like the religious views being taught in evangelical or
Catholic schools, I should not have to pay tax money for their support. 6 3 And,
of course, he appeals to the American founding; he thinks that this is precisely
the issue the Establishment Clause was intended to resolve.'
64
I would agree with him 100% if we were giving money to support the
religious functions of churches. How to finance the church was the central issue
of church-state relations in late-eighteenth century America, and the issue was
resolved in favor of purely private funding. 165 It is still the law, although almost
never litigated, and thus little noticed, that government may not subsidize the
religious functions of a church. That rule creates a special category consisting
only of religion, so it is not a formally neutral rule. Government is free to subsi-
158 Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 182 (1990).
159 See id. at 182-84 (arguing that schools may not constitutionally exempt a religious student
from a requirement to wear shorts in gym class).
160 See Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv.
379, 381 ("[T]he First Amendment itself limits the extension of free speech protection to religious
speech whenever that protection would undermine the separation of church and state.").
161 See Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French Ap-
proach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1 (2005).
162 See Gey, supra note 19, at 739 (arguing that in the voucher cases, "the government is not
only actively touting the virtues of one religion over another; it is also using its coercive taxing
authority to force one person to support another person's faith").
163 See, e.g., id. at 776 (arguing, in the context of the school funding cases, that "[forcing one
set of adherents to pay for the sectarian activities of their religious adversaries is quintessentially
coercive").
164 See, e.g., id. at 745 (arguing that the theory of the voucher cases "leads to the conclusion
that Patrick Henry was correct and James Madison was wrong about the basic requisites of reli-
gious liberty").
165 Compare Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid, supra note 2, at 894-902 (reviewing founding-
era debates over government-paid clergy), with id. at 913-19 (reviewing lack of debate about
nonfinancial support of religion).
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dize anything else it chooses-education, 66 farmers, 167 ethanol, 68 bridges to
nowhere, 69 you name it. For decades we subsidized tobacco farmers 70 while
simultaneously subsidizing medical care for smokers.' 7' Every other interest
group is free to seek subsidies for its core functions. But churches are not.
That rule is not formally neutral, but it is as close as we can come to
substantively neutral. No subsidies to churches and no taxes from churches is
the best we can do to prevent the fiscal operations of the government from either
encouraging or discouraging churches. And if the substantively-neutral course
is a little murky here, it is clarified by the cognate principle of voluntarism-
religious people should fund their own churches in their own way-and by the
history of the founding.
I said above that if I could link substantive neutrality with separation,
then one side or the other had made a mistaken judgment about the meaning of
neutrality or the meaning of separation. I think that is in fact what happened. I
think it happened in the nineteenth century, when the Protestant majority
equated funding of schools with the funding of churches. Certainly there is
overlap: religious instruction goes on in churches, and religious instruction goes
on in religious schools. Even worship goes on in both places. And if govern-
ment pays the entire cost of a religious school, it will pay for the school's reli-
gious instruction.
166 Every state operates a system of free public schools.
167 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Farm Subsidies Seem Immune To an Overhaul - Crop
Prices Are Good, but Lobby Is Strong, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at Al (reporting substantial
failure of political effort to limit farm subsidies); Andrew Martin, Making Waves in Dairyland:
Lawmaker Raises Hackles with Plan for Deep Cuts in Subsidies to Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2007, at C1 (reporting that federal government paid $16 billion in farm subsidies in 2006).
168 See, e.g., Alexei Barrioneuvo, 6 Get Grants From U.S. to Support Bio-Refineries, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1 , 2007, at C3 (reporting that "corn-based ethanol ... has relied for many years on a
51-cent-a-gallon subsidy to be competitive with gasoline," and that government "would provide
up to $385 million in six bio-refinery projects that would produce cellulosic ethanol").
169 The "bridge to nowhere," made famous in 2005 debates about earmarked Congressional
appropriations, would have gone from Ketchikan, Alaska, on the mainland, to the city's airport on
Gravina Island, population 50. Congress appropriated the money to the state of Alaska and let the
state choose whether to use it for this bridge. See, e.g., William Yardley, Alaska Bridge Projects
Resist Earmarks Purge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A13. The Governor of Alaska, however,
decided that "the bridge really was going nowhere" and officially abandoned the project. Alaska
Seeks Alternative to Bridge Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007. Of course, this was a political
decision not to build the bridge, not a decision about lack of government authority to build the
bridge.
170 See, e.g., Simon Romero, In Tobacco Country, Growers Keep Their Fingers Crossed for a
Windfall, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at A10 (describing plan to buy out "tobacco production
quotas created by a Depression-era subsidy program").
171 State payments for medical care for diseases caused by tobacco, under programs such as
Medicaid, were the basis for the state claims that led to the large settlements between states and
tobacco companies. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REv. 847, 852-55 (1999).
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But secular instruction also goes on in these schools. They satisfy the
compulsory education requirements. They teach skills and knowledge that gov-
ernment also teaches in its public schools. To refuse to pay for a child's educa-
tion because of her parents' religious choices is very different from refusing to
pay the salary of the clergy.
The problem, of course, is that religious and secular education are com-
bined in these schools. The government is forbidden to pay for one and obliged
to pay for the other, but the two courses of instruction share facilities and staff
and sometimes may be commingled in textbooks and lesson plans, though my
impression is that usually they are not. No solution is perfect, but that is hardly
unusual. It is very difficult for government to have no effect on people's reli-
gious incentives; government is the 800-pound gorilla in the society. Govern-
ment spends a third of gross domestic product;172 it also has the power to regu-
late behavior and to throw people in jail. In a regime of substantive neutrality,
the magnitude of effects matters; we must sometimes choose a small degree of
support for religion to avoid a very large penalty on religion, or vice versa.
73
This is such a case. It is more nearly neutral, and allows more private choice-
more liberty-for government to pay the cost of education in secular subjects,
offered in a religious environment, than to offer large education subsidies only
to those families willing to abandon the religious environment.
I am inclined to add, although the Court apparently is not, that govern-
ment can never pay the full cost of a religious school.1 74 The rationale that the
state is paying for secular courses, whether delivered in a secular or religious
environment, implies that some reasonable portion of the cost should be allo-
cated to the religious function, and the school should pay that part itself. But
there are counterarguments. This allocation requires someone to investigate the
school's curriculum to determine the percentage of cost allocable to religious
instruction. Ideally, government would do that allocation in round numbers and
in a minimally intrusive way, but ideals are hard to achieve. If the number thus
determined is never reviewed, a school could increase its proportion of religious
instruction and still collect the same government funds. If the number is re-
viewed at frequent intervals, there is persistent pressure on schools to reduce
their religious instruction and collect more government funds. Maybe it would
be better to think of vouchers as a purchase of services at a fixed price; if the
172 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007,
at 266 tbl. 420 (126th ed., 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ (total
current expenditures of state and local governments in 2005 were $1,686,400,000,000); id. at 307
tbl. 458 (total federal outlays in 2005 were $2,472,200,000,000); id. at 428 tbl. 648 (gross domes-
tic product in 2005 was $12,487,100,000,000).
173 See Laycock, supra note 4, at 1008 ("Substantive neutrality always requires that the encour-
agement of one policy be compared to the discouragement of alternative policies.").
174 See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 169-71 (noting that the Court's "true
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government gets the secular value it bargained for, the school's cost of deliver-
ing those services should be irrelevant. I have waffled before on the choice be-
tween these two rules, and suggested that the choice might depend on context,
75
and I am no closer to a confident judgment now.
Even if the private school must pay for religious instruction itself, it is
enormously easier for churches to run these schools if government pays for the
secular part of the program. But it is enormously more difficult to run these
schools if government offers a free secular education to all children and with-
holds that support from anyone who chooses a religious education.
My view that subsidizing secular subjects in a school is fundamentally
different from subsidizing religious functions in a church is one of the central
points on which Professor Gey and I disagree. Subsidizing a religiously-
affiliated school aids religion, and for him, that makes schools the equivalent of
churches. Assessing the Court's recent decisions, he says that "government can
provide financial assistance for religious education, which is one of the primary
mechanisms by which churches cultivate their young members and attract new
adherents."'' 76 I suspect that these schools do much better at cultivating young
members than at attracting new adherents, 77 but I do not disagree with his basic
point. Religion benefits when government helps fund church-affiliated schools.
For Gey, that is the end of the analysis; for me, it is only half the analysis. We
must compare that benefit to the consequences of any alternative policy, and the
alternative is for government to offer up to $10,000 for education to those fami-
lies, and only those families, who surrender their constitutional right to get that
education in a religious environment. The coercive effect of that conditional
offer dwarfs the benefit to religion of making the money available on equal
terms.
This disagreement also can be thought of as a baseline question. Gey
would measure the impact on religion from a baseline of the government doing
nothing-or at least, doing nothing relevant to a decision on whether to fund
religious schools. If government did nothing, these schools would have to fully
fund themselves, in secular and religious subjects alike; compared to that, any
government money is aid.
I would measure the impact on religion from a baseline of what the
government is already doing, or, to put it another way, from a baseline of how
175 See id. at 170-71.
176 Gey, supra note 19, at 776.
177 I put this question to Rev. Andrew Greeley, the Chicago priest and sociologist. He was not
aware of any data on conversion rates for students enrolled in religious schools. Anecdotally, he
recalled that in the early years of black Protestant enrollment in Catholic schools in Chicago, some
priests pressured families to convert. The resulting conversions rarely lasted, wiser heads pre-
vailed within the church, and the effort was abandoned. Interview with Andrew M. Greeley, in
Grand Beach, Michigan, August 4, 2007. The practice might be different among evangelical
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government treats the same activity-education in reading, math, etc.-in a
wholly secular environment. These two baselines were the same in 1785, when
there were no public schools and when government funded almost nothing in
the private sector. But they are not the same today. From the perspective of
what government is already doing, government offers to spend money for edu-
cation, and one who chooses religious education forfeits that money.
More fundamentally, the choice of baseline depends on the practical in-
centives that will ensue. If government money is equally available for any
school, then the family's choice can be made on the educational and religious
merits of the schools, and the government money will have no effect on the
choice. Generalizing this point, the equal treatment baseline minimizes the gov-
ernment's effect on incentives in government spending programs, so long as all
the funded institutions offer a genuine secular service that government can fund
in either a religious or a secular context.1 78 Of course government has to moni-
tor enough to confirm that the secular service is really being delivered. But at
least for schools, that monitoring is already in place: government has to confirm
that a private school satisfies the compulsory education laws.
As to the taxpayers who object to funding religious education, I would
explain that they are paying for secular education, and the church is paying for
the religious instruction. Probably this would mollify very few of them. But
any effect on them is just too small and too attenuated to outweigh the effect, on
families choosing schools, of funding some options and not others. Each tax-
payer's money goes into an enormous pool, making an infinitesimal fraction of
the government's budget, and government then spends a small fraction of that
budget to support secular education in religious institutions, and that expendi-
ture makes it easier for those institutions to teach religion with their own funds.
This is not nearly a big enough effect to outweigh the large penalty we tradi-
tionally impose on the choice to be educated in a religious environment.
Any grievance on behalf of the taxpayer is further ameliorated by the
fact that his money is spread, on an equal opportunity basis, across schools
teaching a wide range of views. His money goes to schools he supports as well
as to those he opposes, and the schools he supports also get taxes from his ideo-
logical enemies. The ideological benefit and burden to each taxpayer is small to
begin with, and it tends to balance out. The Court has emphasized the balanc-
ing-out effect of viewpoint neutrality in its cases on using state-authorized dues
and fees to support private political speech. Dissenters have a right to withhold
178 In the free exercise cases, where government prohibits conduct that is the exercise of relig-
ion for some people, the baseline of government doing nothing usually minimizes the effect on
incentives. Regulation and threat of penalty discourages religion; exemption usually does little to
encourage religion. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. But the problem becomes much
more difficult if religious behavior aligns with self-interest, as in conscientious objection to serv-
ing in the military or paying taxes. Then exemptions must be denied or conditioned on the imposi-
tion of some alternative burden. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 1016-18. For a more extensive
analysis of the problem of choosing baselines, see Laycock, Liberty, supra note 5, at 349-52.
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the part of their dues and fees that goes to such uses, 17 9 but not if the money is
distributed on a viewpoint-neutral basis.
180
I have been analyzing an ideal program in which government provides
equal funding for any school a family chooses, subject only to the constraint that
government cannot pay for that part of a school's cost that is reasonably allo-
cated to the religious part of the education it offers. Of course, this does not
describe any actual program. Programs enacted by the political process depart
from this ideal in multiple ways.
In Cleveland, as in most such programs, the financial incentives still
tipped toward the secular public schools. Students got a bigger government
subsidy if they chose a secular public school, 18' although many of those who
chose a private school got a second subsidy from the private school. The opin-
ions give little information about the size of the two subsidies combined, but the
subsidy from private schools appears to generally be small. 82 More important,
families paid less if they chose a public school. Private schools could charge
low-income students $250 in cash in addition to the voucher,1 83 and could
charge other students the full difference between the school's tuition and the
state's voucher. 84 Public schools were free.' 85 This is considerably less than
full substantive neutrality, but because the discrimination is against religion, it
in no way suggests a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Nor do I argue that this discrimination is unconstitutional, which is to
say, I do not argue that voucher programs are constitutionally required. Gov-
ernment may discriminate between public schools and private schools, even if
that discrimination has disparate impact on religion. It is difficult or impossible
to construct a plausible doctrinal argument that government must create privat-
179 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 9-16 (1990) (bar dues); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977) (union dues).
180 See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233-34 (2000) (holding that viewpoint
neutral distribution adequately protects the First Amendment interest in not paying for private
political speech with which one disagrees).
181 See Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646-48, 654 (2002). Ohio spent far more per
student on public schools than it paid in vouchers. Compare id. at 646 (voucher for private school
capped at $2250), with id. at 647-48 (per student spending of $7746 in public schools).
182 Justice Souter cites average tuition figures from a variety of sources, ranging from well
below the voucher amount at the average Catholic elementary school to "about $4,000" at nonre-
ligious schools. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 705-06 & n.14 (Souter, J., dissenting). He also cites data
suggesting that part of the reason religious schools can charge lower tuition is that they get subsi-
dies from their church and secular private schools do not. Id. at n.14. If we take his $4000 figure
for tuition at secular private schools as a reasonable measure of the cost of a private education,
then the combined public and private subsidy to a low-income voucher student would still be well
below the subsidy of more than $7000 available to that student in free public schools. It should be
emphasized that all these numbers are from the 1990s, so they would be higher now, and that
there is wide variation around these averages.
183 See id. at 646 (opinion of the Court).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 654.
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ized options for the services it provides. 86 I do think it is unconstitutional for
government to discriminate between secular private schools and religious pri-
vate schools, 187 but the only Supreme Court decision so far upholds such dis-
crimination, 1 8 in an ambiguous opinion of unclear scope.1
89
Other features of real-world voucher programs arguably encourage
families to choose religious schools. In most cities, there are more religious
private schools than secular private schools, so the newly-available choices are
disproportionately religious. In Cleveland, the suburban public schools refused
to participate; the state lacked the political will to require them to participate;
and the political conditions that generated these results are likely to be quite
common. The Cleveland public schools were dysfunctional, so that pursuit of
educational quality might lead some families to choose religious schools even if
they objected to the religious content. The vouchers were small, more attractive
to a school operating on a shoestring budget, and therefore, on average more
attractive to religious private schools than to secular private schools. Because
the political party that supports vouchers opposes taxes to fund government pro-
grams, the political conditions that generated such a small voucher also are
likely to be quite general.
This is not the forum to consider all the issues relevant to ideal or rea-
sonable or minimally-acceptable implementation of a voucher plan. But a few
points can be made in general terms. The encouragement to choose a religious
school suggested by these factors is partially or entirely counterbalanced by the
financial incentive still running the other way: vouchers in Cleveland required a
copayment, and the political conditions that led to that requirement are likely to
be quite general, but the public schools are always free. To say that religious
schools are disqualified if they provide too good an education would create bi-
zarre and perverse incentives.' 90 An offer of better quality does not constrain
186 See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5, at 173 (noting that claims to discrimina-
tion against religion "arise only after the state makes a voluntary decision to fund attendance at
private institutions").
187 See id. at 195-200 (arguing that government discretion to include or exclude religious insti-
tutions from funding programs is the worst of all possible worlds).
188 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
189 On the fundamental ambiguity of Davey, see Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 5,
at 184-87 (noting that opinion may be confined to the training of clergy or expanded to cover all
funding programs); Berg & Laycock, supra note 5, at 229-30 (explaining that the opinion has two
independent rationales, one of which would be confined to the training of clergy and one of which
would reach all funding programs).
190 In the context of halfway houses for parolees, Judge Posner hyperbolically predicted a race
to the bottom. If religious providers were disqualified whenever they offered higher quality pro-
grams than their secular competitors, Posner feared that they would reduce quality to remain eli-
gible for vouchers, and secular private providers would reduce their quality to make their religious
competition ineligible. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 884 (7th
Cir. 2003). The fallacy here was to implicitly assume that providers care about nothing except the
eligibility of religious providers. One need not go that far to reject a rule that vouchers can be
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choice; it expands choice. More generally, substantive neutrality is designed to
implement liberty, and offering additional choices increases liberty. Students in
Cleveland are better off with a choice of weak public schools and better private
schools than with weak public schools only, even if they are not entirely happy
with either choice.
Even if you find these points utterly unpersuasive and remain convinced
that the Cleveland plan steered students toward religious schools, you have to
consider the alternative. Any encouragement to choose religious education
would be a considerably smaller departure from substantive neutrality than the
enormous encouragement to choose secular schools inherent in offering to
spend thousands of dollars on each child who chooses a secular school but zero
on each child who chooses a religious school.
Choice would be eliminated, and students would be forced into religious
schools, if there were not enough seats in secular schools to meet the demand.
This is not a problem in primary and secondary education, where the public
schools guarantee a seat to all comers, but it is a problem in social services. I
have testified that the Bush Administration's faith-based initiative is "a fraud"
unless accompanied by enough funds to actually implement the original com-
mitment to guarantee a secular alternative to every program beneficiary who
requests one. 191 And a gerrymandered program that deliberately steered students
to religious schools might well be unconstitutional, although there may be insu-
perable problems in creating a judicially-administrable rule to implement that
intuition. This and other problems of implementing voucher plans require fur-
ther analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
I doubt that I have persuaded many readers to abandon long-held posi-
tions on either funding religious schools or government-sponsored religious
observances. I do hope that I have induced a bit of doubt and expanded lines of
thought, and that I have helped clarify the source of disagreements among me,
Professor Feldman, Professor Gey, and the Supreme Court. Getting government
out of the way of religious choices, and minimizing the pressure that govern-
ment brings to bear on either believers or nonbelievers, is an attractive goal.
Achieving that goal may require rethinking some old assumptions.
used at bad religious schools but not at religious schools good enough to attract students on the
basis of educational quality.
191 Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Competitions for Federal Social Ser-
vice Funds, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong., Serial No. 17, at 48 (2001) (statement by Douglas Laycock) ("[W]e will
protect the beneficiary by really making available an alternate provider. You have got to really do
that or this program is a fraud."); see also id. at 25 (emphasizing in written statement that ready
availability of secular providers is essential but difficult to provide in social service programs); id.
at 55 ("If funding continues to shrink, this thing will not work at all.").
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